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Criminal Law-Evidence-CONFESSION TO POLYGRAPH OPERATOR PRIOR TO
ACTUAL TEST HELD ADMISSIBLE-Jones v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 723, 204
S.E.2d 247 (1974).
Rules of evidence governing the admissibility of confessions have devel-
oped gradually throughout the history of Anglo-American jurisprudence.
Initially any confession was admissible regardless of the methods by which
it was obtained.' The basic consideration was that the evidence admitted
be truthful and reliable. 2 To protect the integrity of judicial proceedings,
safeguards were later developed to insure the reliability of confessions by
a determination of the voluntariness with which they were given.3 Courts
have struggled with the problem of formulating a workable definition of
voluntariness and have not yet developed a uniform substantive test.'
Several procedures have been developed to provide for a determination
of the voluntariness of a confession.' Virginia follows the "Wigmore" or
1. See D. JARDINE, A READING ON THE USE OF TORTURE IN THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND
PREVIOUSLY TO THE COMMONWEALTH 73-109 (1837); 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 818 (Chadbourn
Rev. 1970). Cf. J. LANGBEIN, PROSECUTING CRiME IN THE RENAISSANCE 205-07 (1974).
2. Gradually it was recognized that torture and other forms of mental and physical coercion
had a harmful effect on the reliability of confessions thus obtained. "Pain and force may
compel men to confess what is not the truth of facts and consequently such extorted confes-
sions are not to be depended upon." G. GILBERT, EVIDENCE 1371 (1726). See generally Regina
v. Baldry, 169 Eng. Rep. 568 (Ct. Crim. App. 1852); Regina v. Morton, 174 Eng. Rep. 367
(n.p. 1843) (confession inadmissible if produced by false hope or fear); Regina v. Drew, 173
Eng. Rep. 433 (n.p. 1835) (inducement held out by a person in authority renders a confession
inadmissible); King v. Warickshall, 168 Eng. Rep. 234 (K.B. 1783) (confession obtained under
a promise of leniency or pardon by officials inadmissible under practice of approvement
whereby one giving evidence implicating an accomplice is entitled to a pardon for himself);
King v. Rudd, 168 Eng. Rep. 160 (K.B. 1775).
3. For an overview of the historical and substantive development of the law of confessions
see generally 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 815-63 (Chadboum Rev. 1970); Developments in the
Law of Confessions, 79 HARv. L. REv. 938 (1966).
4. Perhaps the best definition was given by Mr. Justice Jackson in his dissenting opinion
in Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 161 (1944). "A confession is wholly and incontestably
voluntary only if a guilty person gives himself up to the law and becomes his own accuser."
The following is a sample of other judicial attempts to define voluntariness: A confession is
voluntary within the meaning of the law if it is not given "... in consequence of induce-
ments of a temporal nature, held out by one in authority, touching the charge preferred, or
because of a threat or promise by or in the presence of such person. . . ." Hopt v. Utah, 110
U.S. 574, 585 (1884). "A confession is voluntary in law if, and only if, it was, in fact, voluntar-
ily made." Ziang Sun Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1, 14 (1924).
5. The "Wigmore" or "orthodox" procedure is now followed by twenty-six states and the
1st, 5th and 10th circuits. This procedure involves a hearing by the judge, out of the presence
of the jury, of all the facts bearing on the issue of voluntariness. If the judge determines that
the confession is voluntary, he allows it to be admitted into evidence and the jury weighs only
its credibility.
The Massachusetts or "humane" rule is followed by nineteen states, the District of Colum-
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"orthodox" procedure.6 The development of federal rules governing admis-
sibility has been affected by a long line of Supreme Court decisions broad-
ening the scope of the law of confessions to include an inquiry into the due
process-fundamental fairness area embraced in the fourteenth amend-
ment.' This standard for the admissibility of confessions was made applic-
able to the states through the fourteenth amendment.8 In applying due
bia and the 4th and 9th circuits. In this procedure the judge hears all the evidence bearing
on the voluntariness of the confession before ruling on its admissibility. If he finds that the
confession is voluntary and admits it, the jury is then instructed that it must also find the
confession voluntary before considering it.
Prior to Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), seventeen jurisdictions followed the New
York procedure in which the trial judge made a preliminary determination regarding the
voluntariness of the confession and if under no circumstances it could be deemed voluntary,
the judge excluded it. However, if there was a factual conflict as to the voluntariness of the
statement, the judge admitted it into evidence and the jury would determine both the volun-
tariness and the credibility of the confession. This procedure was held constitutionally defec-
tive in Jackson. Of those jurisdictions which followed the New York rule, Arizona, Arkansas,
Georgia, South Carolina, and Puerto Rico have not made any final determination of the
procedure which will be followed. For an exhaustive listing of the cases following each
procedure, see 368 U.S. at 411-23; 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 861, 585-90 (Chadbourn Rev. 1970).
See also Meltzer, Involuntary Confessions: The Allocation of Responsibility Between the
Judge and Jury, 21 U. Cm. L. REv. 317 (1954).
6. Mathews v. Commonwealth, 207 Va. 915, 153 S.E.2d 238 (1967); Reid v. Common-
wealth, 206 Va. 464, 144 S.E.2d 310 (1965); Upshur v. Commonwealth, 170 Va. 649, 197 S.E.
435 (1938). See note 5 supra.
7. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (right to be informed of all constitu-
tional rights such as the right to remain silent and the right to counsel); Massiah v. United
States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (right to have counsel present during interrogation); Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (right to counsel prior to indictment); Mallory v. United States,
354 U.S. 449 (1957) (delay in arraignment); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943)
(illegal detention and delay in arraignment).
8. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). However, the due process standard used in
weighing the effect of an inducement to confess does not include the traditional "state action"
requirement. Rather, the test is whether the person offering the inducement is one "in author-
ity." There have been three primary approaches to the determination of what constitutes a
person in authority whose inducements would be sufficient to render a confession made to
him inadmissible.
(1) The English rule, applied by a few American courts where the complaining party in a
lawsuit has been held to be a person in authority. Sullivan v. State, 66 Ark. 506, 51 S.W. 828
(1899) (owner of stolen property held person in authority).
(2) Rule admitting any statement induced by an unofficial person. United States v.
Stone, 8 F. 232 (W.D. Tenn. 1881) (confession to private detective employed by owner of
stolen goods held admissible). Accord, Early v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. 921, 11 S.E. 795
(1890).
(3) A majority of courts follow the rule whereby a "person in authority" is decided on a
case by case determination of whether the accused reasonably believed the person offering
the inducement had the power or authority to carry out the inducement so as to render it
effective. See People v. Luis, 158 Cal. 185, 110 P. 580 (1910) (bystander not person in author-
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process standards to confessions, some state courts have made a further
distinction by excluding confessions obtained where the accused has been
deceived or tricked by the police,9 while admitting those where the decep-
tion is carried out by a private individual."
In Virginia the admissibility of confessions under the "Wigmore" rule
depends upon whether the confession is trustworthy as evidence."1 Prior to
Miranda v. Arizona, 2 Virginia law did not require that a suspect in custody
be informed of his constitutional rights during police interrogation, and
confessions thus obtained were admitted into evidence."
In Jones v. Commonwealth," the Virginia Supreme Court reaffirmed its
ity); State v. Thorp, 334 Mo. 46, 64 S.W.2d 249 (1933) (private detective held not person in
authority); State v. Force, 69 Neb. 162, 95 N.W. 42 (1903) (father urging confession from
minor son held person in authority).
State courts have also applied the fundamental fairness doctrine in reviewing police proce-
dures involved in obtaining confessions. People v. Everett, 10 N.Y.2d 500, 180 N.E.2d 556,
225 N.Y.S.2d 193, cert. denied, 370 U.S. 963 (1962).
9. Early v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. 921, 11 S.E. 795 (1890) (private detective not a person
in authority whose promise of secrecy would be sufficient inducement to render a confession
inadmissible); Fincher v. State, 211 Ala. 388, 100 So. 657 (1924) (promise of secrecy not within
meaning of rule excluding involuntary confessions); People v. Stadnick, 207 Cal. App. 2d 767,
25 Cal. Rptr. 30 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (confession obtained by police eavesdropping held
admissible); Blackwell v. State, 113 Ga. App. 536, 148 S.E.2d 912 (1966) (eavesdropping by
police after promise of privacy did not render confession inadmissible); Ford v. State, 181 Md.
303, 29 A.2d 833 (1943) (confession admissible because it was not the result of threats or
inducements); State v. Thompson, 38 Wash. 2d 774, 232 P.2d 87 (1951) (confession obtained
by artifice, trickery or fraud does not alone render the confession inadmissible even though
the practice of obtaining confessions in this manner may be objectionable). See also M.
Koessler, The Admissibility of Confessions Obtained by Trickery, 50 A.B.A.J. 648 (1964).
10. See Paroutian v. United States, 370 F.2d 631 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 943
(1967); People v. Bowman, 240 Cal. App. 2d 358, 49 Cal. Rptr. 772 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966);
People v. Teale, 63 Cal. 2d 178, 404 P.2d 209, 45 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1965); People v. Price, 63
Cal. 2d 370, 406 P.2d 55, 46 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1965); People v. Milani, 39 Ill. 2d 22, 233 N.E.2d
398, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 865 (1968) (confession volunteered to inmate held admissible);
Heldt v. State, 20 Neb. 492, 30 N.W. 626 (1886) (confession made to detective pretending to
be fellow prisoner held admissible); People v. Everett, 10 N.Y.2d 500, 180 N.E.2d 556, 225
N.Y.S.2d 193, cert. denied, 370 U.S. 963 (1962); State v. Rush, 108 W. Va. 254, 150 S.E. 740
(1929) (assurance by bank examiner that statements by accused could not be used against
him did not render statements inadmissible).
11. Owens v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 689, 43 S.E.2d 895 t1947).
12. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
13. Mendoza v. Commonwealth, 199 Va. 961, 103 S.E.2d 1, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 873
(1958). The court said that while it would be better police procedure for police to warn suspect
of her constitutional rights prior to questioning it is not required. Failure to so warn does not
render a confession inadmissible. See also Biddle v. Commonwealth, 206 Va. 14, 141 S.E.2d
710 (1965).
14. 214 Va. 723, 204 S.E.2d 247 (1974).
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adherence to the traditional voluntariness standard. Jones was arrested for
the armed robbery of a drug store. Due to his status as a suspect in several
other robberies, bail was set at $50,000. At the suggestion of counsel, Jones
submitted to a polygraph test administered by a private agency, for the
purpose of having bail reduced if the test proved successful. Prior to the
actual test, Jones was interviewed by the operator in a separate room.
Unknown to Jones, his counsel and two police detectives who had accom-
panied him were in an adjacent room where they could see and hear the
test being administered. After some preliminary remarks,"5 the polygraph
operator told Jones that if he would tell him what places he had robbed,
that he would not ask about them during the test; whereupon Jones told
the operator that he had in fact held up the drug store. Jones' counsel made
no attempt to stop the questioning or to object to the nature of the conver-
sation.16 At trial, the court ruled that the statement to the operator was
voluntary and hence admissible. 7 On appeal the Virginia Supreme Court
15. The polygraph operator told Jones that he was Cuban by birth, ostensibly to demon-
strate his lack of racial bias. He also made certain disparaging comments about one of the
police officers who had accompanied Jones to the office. He then told Jones that, under the
fifth amendment, Jones did not have to take the polygraph test.
16. The court indicates that counsel's action, or inaction is significant, perhaps as an
indication that Jones had waived his right to remain silent. Id. at 725, 204 S.E.2d at 249.
See also note 28 infra.
17. Jones was convicted in the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond. Jones appealed the
verdict citing several errors including the trial court's admission of his confession to the
polygraph operator. Jones claimed that since the results of a polygraph test are inadmissible
in Virginia under Skinner v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 260, 183 S.E.2d 725 (1971), and Lee v.
Commonwealth, 200 Va. 233, 105 S.E.2d 152 (1958), statements made to a polygraph operator
prior to the test should also be excluded. The Supreme Court granted a writ of error limited
to the consideration of the admission of the polygraph operator's testimony concerning Jones'
confession. 214 Va. at 724-25, 204 S.E.2d at 747-48. The Supreme Court properly rejected
Jones' argument finding no connection between the exclusion of testimony by the operator
as to what actually occurred and the admissibility of an interpretation of electronic data, the
reliability of which has not yet been established. Id. at 724, 204 S.E.2d at 248, 249.
18. The Miranda decision, in dealing with the issue of in-custody police interrogation,
stated that police deception in obtaining a waiver by the accused of his constitutional rights
would render a confession inadmissible. 384 U.S. at 453, 476. The Jones case does not fall
within this proscription because of the lack of any demonstrable relationship between the
polygraph operator and the state. The opinion emphasizes that the indicia of an agency
relationship show that the operator was retained by Jones, and that Jones initiated the test
without any encouragement or discouragement from the state, therefore the operator was
Jones' agent. Also, it must be assumed that, because the test was administered at the opera-
tor's regular place of business, he was aware of the fact, or at least the possibility, that Jones
was being observed by the police. The deception was carried out by the operator without the
active participation of the police and in the presence of Jones' counsel. 214 Va. at 724-26,
204 S.E.2d at 247-49. Cases which have excluded confessions obtained by police trickery have
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held that the confession was properly admitted into evidence and affirmed
Jones' conviction.
In its short opinion, the court determined that Jones' confession was
voluntary and that the polygraph operator was not acting as an agent of
the state, therefore, the Miranda and other warnings were inapplicable."8
Furthermore, even though Jones had been tricked into making the confes-
sion, it would still be admissible because it was not given under circum-
stances likely to produce a false statement."
The court cited Penn v. Commonwealth" as dispositive of the issue of
voluntariness. There the suspect had not been subjected to any treatment
which would render a confession involuntary.2 ' While this approach is the
prevailing one, the possible trend toward a broader due process inquiry
might have been explored. The court noted that the circumstances present
in the McNabb2-Miranda line of cases were not present. Jones was not
deprived of counsel, nor held incommunicado, nor subjected to a police
grilling, and his physical needs had been met. Still, the court did not
consider the voluntariness of Jones' statement from the fundamental
fairness-due process standpoint. There was no inquiry as to whether Jones
knowingly confessed or if the deception whereby Jones was being observed
by the police amounted to a denial of due process.2 4 Most states that have
generally involved a violation of a privileged relationship. See Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556
(1954) (confession elicited by police-employed psychiatrist held violation of doctor-patient
privilege); People v. Barker, 60 Mich. 277, 27 N.W. 539 (1886) (confession obtained by one
pretending to be representing accused's attorney inadmissible). Statements made in the
presence of, but not at the instigation of the police have also been admitted. People v. Petker,
254 Cal. App. 2d 652, 432 P.2d 231, 62 Cal. Rptr. 215 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967). Confessions
obtained by deception initiated by the police but carried out by a third party have also been
held admissible. See People v. Ragen, 262 Cal. App. 2d 392, 68 Cal. Rptr. 700 (Dist. Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1000 (1968); People v. Hays, 250 Cal. App. 2d 96, 58 Cal. Rptr. 241
(Dist. Ct. App. 1967). See also discussion notes 9 & 10 supra. But see Spano v. New York,
360 U.S. 315 (1959).
19, See Owens v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 689, 43 S.E.2d 895 (1947); Early v. Common-
wealth, 86 Va. 921, 11 S.E. 795 (1890). But see Cooper v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 883, 140
S.E.2d 688 (1965) (confession elicited by subjecting accused to emotional stress was held
inadmissible).
20. 210 Va. 213, 169 S.E.2d 409 (1969).
21. Justice Harrison observed that Jones, like Penn, had not been subjected to any coercion
or police interrogation, and that there had been no promises or threats made by the police.
The opinion reemphasized the trustworthiness of the evidence and not due process as the
critical consideration for determining the admissibility of a confession in Virginia. 214 Va. at
726, 204 S.E.2d at 249.
22. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
23. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
24. 214 Va. at 725-26, 204 S.E.2d at 249. See generally United States ex rel. Everett v.
1975]
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considered the question of confessions obtained by deception or eavesdrop-
ping by the police have held that such practices do not render a confession
inadmissible." Yet, some courts have expressed distaste for these practices
even though admitting the confessions thus obtained."
The rationale in Jones would be more persuasive if such issues were
expressly dealt with, rather than presumed. The very heart of the issue was
the voluntary nature of Jones' admission. While the polygraph operator
was not an actual agent of the state, other jursidictions have held that
reliance on a polygraph operator's promise of secrecy or other inducement
would render a confession to him inadmissible.Y However, these cases can
be distinguished on the basis that the polygraph test was initiated by the
state rather than by the defendant.
The opinion further noted that Jones' counsel made no objection to the
interview by the polygraph operator and that this was evidence of the
voluntariness of Jones' confession. Counsel's failure to object might have
in itself raised a due process question of Jones' sixth amendment right to
effective counsel.? Furthermore, it is the function of the bench as well as
Murphy, 329 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 963 (1964); United States v. Remolif,
227 F. Supp. 420 (D. Nev. 1964); People v. Ketchel, 59 Cal. 2d 503, 381 P.2d 394, 30 Cal.
Rptr. 538 (1963).
25. See People v. Price, 63 Cal. 2d 370, 406 P.2d 55, 46 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1965); Common-
wealth v. Sullivan, 354 Mass. 598, 239 N.E.2d 5 (1968); State v. O'Kelly, 181 Neb. 618, 150
N.W.2d 117 (1967); State v. Cadena, 74 Wash. 2d 185, 443 P.2d 826 (1968).
26. Mendoza v. Commonwealth, 199 Va. 961, 103 S.E.2d 1, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 873
(1958); State v. Thompson, 38 Wash. 2d 774, 232 P.2d 87 (1951).
27. See People v. Brown, 198 Cal. App. 2d 253, 17 Cal. Rptr. 884 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
Defendant's confession made to a polygraph operator after operator had told him that he
would not be charged if he would admit the crime was held inadmissible. The court said that
the defendant reasonably believed that the polygraph operator was in a position to offer such
inducements and a confession thus made was involuntary and inadmissible. The same result
was reached in State v. LaFernier, 37 Wis. 2d 365, 155 N.W.2d 93 (1967), where a spontaneous
confession made to a polygraph operator (who was not an agent of the state) in the presence
of a police officer was held inadmissible because the defendant had not been warned again
of his rights prior to his statement and the possibility of a waiver by defendant of his Miranda
rights must be proven to have been knowingly made. This court further interpreted Miranda
to require that warnings be given prior to each interrogation.
28. It is interesting to note here that in a recent federal case in Virginia, Redd v. Peyton,
303 F. Supp. 320 (W.D. Va. 1969), an argument was made on appeal that the accused in a
murder case had been denied his sixth amendment right to effective counsel because of his
counsel's failure to object to the admission into evidence of defendant's involuntary confes-
sion. The argument was unsuccessful, but it is one that perhaps could have been made in
the Jones case where counsel permitted police detectives to be present and to listen to the
conversation between the polygraph operator and Jones without Jones' knowledge. Cf. Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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the bar to protect the constitutional rights of an individual if they are
infringed upon.
While the Virginia Supreme Court said that reliability of the evidence
is the underlying reason for a determination of its voluntariness, the
United States Supreme Court has noted that the truth or falsity of the
confession should not be the controlling factor in the determination of
admissibility. 9
Although the Jones decision was in accord with the prevailing state law,
there is a possible trend developing in the law outside of Virginia subject-
ing extra-judicial confessions to a more rigid due process standard." In an
accusatorial system based on the presumption of innocence of the accused
and the protection of an individual's constitutional rights, it is desirable
to insure that the state prove its case without resort to questionable meth-
ods of obtaining evidence or by the utilization of evidence obtained by
private citizens in a manner proscribed to the state.
D.S.O.
29. See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961). Here the Court held that the use of a
legal standard which took into account the probable truth or falsity of the accused's state-
ment was not permitted under the fourteenth amendment due process requirement. A similar
result was reached in Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961); and Lisenba v. California,
314 U.S. 219, reh. denied, 315 U.S. 826 (1941). In Lisenba, the Court stated that the aim of
due process is to prevent fundamental unfairness without regard to the truth or falsity of the
confession. These standards have generally been applied to official actions in obtaining in-
criminating statements and confessions. They have also been applied recently to confessions
obtained by unofficial private persons. Killough v. United States, 336 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir.
1964); People v. Brown, 198 Cal. App. 2d 253, 17 Cal. Rptr. 884 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961);
Commonwealth v. Vento, 410 Pa. 350, 189 A.2d 161 (1963). An early case which reached the
same result is State v. Russell, 83 Wis. 330, 53 N.W. 441 (1892), in which the court reversed
a defendant's conviction on the grounds that incriminating statements made to the assistant
prosecutor by the defendant when she thought she was talking to her defense attorney on the
telephone were not admissible.
30. See discussion notes 18, 24, and 29 supra.
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